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ALEXANDER HAMILTON’S 
NOTES 


IN THE 

FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787. 


EDITED BY 

WORTHINGTON GHAUNCEY FORD. 







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ALEXANDER HAMILTON’S 
NOTES 


IN THE 


FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787. 


EDITED BY 

WORTHINGTON CHAUNCEY FORD. 


[Reprinted from the Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical 
Society, June, 1904 .] 


CAMBRIDGE: 

JOHN WILSON AND SON. 
SJntoersitg Dress. 

1904. 











































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ALEXANDER HAMILTON’S NOTES 


IN THE 

FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787. 


The following notes of debates in the Federal Convention 
were taken by Alexander Hamilton, and are contained on a 
few undated sheets of paper among the Hamilton Papers in 
the Library of Congress. I was of the opinion that they might 
have been notes for the Federalist essays, taken from Madison’s 
records; but a more careful examination showed that they 
were independent memoranda, and often adding a little to 
what Madison wrote down in his capacity of self-appointed 
reporter. To show the connection I have drawn off the corre¬ 
sponding sentences in the Madison notes, using the excellent 
edition of Mr. Gaillard Hunt, which in thoroughness and 
accuracy is much in advance of any previous issue. There is 
enough of original matter in the Hamilton notes to justify the 
publication. They show the bent of his mind, and the differ¬ 
ence between the mental tastes of Madison and himself, 
demonstrating why Madison was so much the better reporter 
of debates. But a further point is made : the notes made by 
Paterson have just been printed, and it is known that Jackson, 
the secretary to the convention, made copious notes. May it 
not be conjectured that other members followed the course of 
Madison, Yates, King, Paterson, Jackson, and Hamilton, and 
that we have not yet exhausted the material in existence on 
this most interesting convention. Professors Jameson and 
McLaughlin have shown what can be done towards illustrating 
the documentary history of that .assemblage, and in the same 
spirit I offer these notes of Hamilton. 



4 


June 1, 1787. 

Hamilton. Madison. 


The way to prevent a majority 
from having an interest to oppress 
the minority is to enlarge the 
sphere. 

Madison. Elective Monarchies 
turbulent and unhappy. 

Men unwilling to admit so 
decided a superiority of merit ih 
an individual as to accede to his 
appointment to so preeminent a 
station. 

If several are admitted as there 
will be many competitors of equal 
merit they may be all included — 
contention prevented — & the re¬ 
publican genius consulted. 

Randolph. I. Situation of this 
country peculiar. 

II. Taught the people an aver¬ 
sion to Monarchy. 

III. All their constitutions op¬ 
posed to it. 

IV. Fixed character of the 
people opposed to it. 

V. If proposed will prevent a 
fair discussion of the plan. 

YI. Why cannot three execute? 
View (or voice) of America. 
Safety to liberty the next object. 

Great exertions only requisite 
on particular occasions. 

Legislature may appoint a dic¬ 
tator when necessary. 

Seeds of destruction — slaves ; —■ 
[former continental army struck 
out] might be safely enlisted. 


[Madison. If [Executive Power] 
large, we shall have the Evils of 
Elective Monarchies. Rufus King, 
I, 588,] 


5 • 


May appoint men devoted to 
them — & even bribe the legisla¬ 
ture by offices. 

Chief Magistrate must be free 
from impeachment. 


Wilson. Extent — manners. 

Confederated republic unites ad¬ 
vantages & banishes disadvantages 
of other kinds of governments. 

rendering the executive ineli¬ 
gible an infringement of the right 
of election. 

Bedford, peculiar talents requi¬ 
site for execution , therefore ought 
to be opportunity of ascertaining 
his talents—therefore frequent 
change. 


Princ. 1. The further men are 
from the ultimate point of im¬ 
portance the readier they will be 
[to] concur in a change. 

2. Civilization approximates the 
different species of governments. 

3. Vigour is the result of sev¬ 
eral principles, activity wisdom — 
confidence. 

4. Extent of limits will occasion 
the non attendance of remote mem¬ 
bers & tend to throw the govern¬ 
ment into the hands of the Country 
near the seat of government—a 
reason for strengthening the upper 
branch & multiplying the Induce¬ 
ments to attendance. 


Mr. Bedford was strongly op¬ 
posed to so long a term as seven 
years. He begged the Committee 
to consider what the situation of 
the Country would be, in case the 
first magistrate should be saddled 
on it for such a period and it 
should be found on trial that he 
did not possess the qualifications 
ascribed to him, or should lose 
them after his appointment. Madi¬ 
son, III, 63-4. 


6 


June 6, 1787. 

Principles. 

I. Human mind fond of Com¬ 
promise. 

Maddisons Theory 

Two principles upon which re¬ 
publics ought to be constructed. 

I. That they have such extent 
as to render combinations on the 
ground of Interest difficult. 

II. By a process of election 
calculated to refine the representa¬ 
tion of the People. 

Answer. There is truth in both 
these principles but they do not 
conclude so strongly as he sup¬ 
poses. 

The Assembly when chosen will 
meet in one room if they are drawn 
from half the globe — & will be 
liable to all the passions of popular 
assemblies. 

If more minute links are want¬ 
ing others will supply them. Dis¬ 
tinctions of Eastern middle and 
Southern states will come into 
view; between commercial and 
non commercial States. Imagi¬ 
nary lines will influence, &c. 

Human mind prone to limit its 
view by near and local objects. 

Paper money is capable of giving 
a general impulse. It is easy to 
conceive a popular sentiment per¬ 
vading the E. States. 

Observ. large districts less liable 
to be influenced by factious dem- 
magogues than small. 

Note. This is in some degree 
true but not so generally as may 
be supposed. Frequently small 
portions of the large districts carry 
elections. An influential dem¬ 
agogue will give an impulse to 


7 


the whole. Demagogues are not 
always inconsiderable persons. Pa¬ 
tricians were frequently dema¬ 
gogues. Characters are less known 
& a less active interest taken in 
them. 

A free government to be pre¬ 
ferred to an absolute monarchy 
not because of the occasional vio¬ 
lations of liberty or property, but 
because of the tendency of the 
Free Government to interest the 
passions of the community in its 
favour, beget public spirit and 
public confidence. 

Re. When public mind is pre¬ 
pared to adopt the present plan 
they will outgo our proposition. 
They will never part with Sover¬ 
eignty of the state till they are 
tired (?) of the state governments. 

M r Pinkney. If Legislatures 
do not partake in the appoint¬ 
ment of, they will be more jeal¬ 
ous. 

Pinckney. Elections by the 
State legislatures will be better 
than those by the people. 

Principle. Danger that the 
Executive by too frequent com¬ 
munication with the judicial may 
corrupt it. They may learn to 
enter into his passions. 

Note. At the period which ter¬ 
minates the duration of the Execu¬ 
tive, there will be always an awful 
crisis — in the national situation. 

Note. The arguments to prove 
that a negative would not be used 
would go so far as to prove that 


The State Legislatures also he 
said would be more jealous, & 
more ready to thwart the National 
Gov^, if excluded from a participa¬ 
tion in it. Madison, III, 107. 

He differed from gentlemen who 
thought that a choice by the people 
wd- be a better guard ag st bad 
measures, than by the Legisla¬ 
tures. Madison, III, 107. 



8 


the revisionary power would not 
be exercised. 

M r Mason. The purse & sword 
will be in the hands of the [execu¬ 
tive, struck out ] — legislature. 

One great defect of our Govern¬ 
ments are that they do not present 
objects sufficiently interesting to 
the human mind. 

A reason for leaving little or 
nothing to the state legislatures 
will be that as their objects are 
diminished they will be worse com¬ 
posed. Proper men will be less 
inclined to participate in them. 

June 7, 

Dickinson. He would have the 
state legislatures elect senators, be¬ 
cause he would bring into the gen¬ 
eral government the sense of the 
state Governments & 

because the most respectable 
choices would be made. 


Note. Separate states may give 
stronger organs to their govern¬ 
ments or engage more the good 
will of : — while Gen! Gov. 
Iggf" Consider the Principle of 
Rivalship by excluding the state 
Legislatures. 


The purse & the sword ought 
never to get into the same hands 
whether Legislative or Executive. 
Madison, III, 110. 


1787. 

M r Dickinson had two reasons 
for his motion. 1, because the 
sense of the States would be better 
collected through their Govern¬ 
ments ; than immediately from the 
people at large; 

2. because he wished the Senate 
to consist of the most distinguished 
characters, . . . and he thought 
such characters more likely to be 
selected by the State Legislatures, 
than in any other mode. Madison, 
III, 112. * 


M' Pinckney thought the 2 d . 
branch ought to be permanent & 
independent; & that the members 
of it w d / be rendered more so by 
receiving their appointment from 
the State Legislatures. This mode 
would avoid the rivalships & dis- 


9 


Mason. General government 
could not know how to make laws 
for every part — such as respect 
agriculture , &c. 

particular governments would have 
no defensive power unless let into 
the constitution as a Constituent 
part. 


June 8 

Pinckney. For general Nega¬ 
tive. 


Gerry. Is for negative on pa¬ 
per emissions. 

New States will arise which 
cannot be controuled — & may 
outweigh & controul. 

Wilson. Foreign influence may 
infect certain corners of confed¬ 
eracy what ought to be restrained. 

Union bases of our oppos. & 
Independence.] 

Bedford. Arithmetical calcu¬ 
lation of proportional influence in 
General Government. 

Pensyl. & Delaware may have 
rivalship in commerce — & influ¬ 
ence of Pens, sacrifice delaware. 


contents incident to the election by 
districts. Madison, III, 119. 

Mason. It is impossible for one 
power to pervade the extreme 
parts of the U. S. so as to carry 
equal justice to them. Madison, 
III, 120. 

The State Legislatures also 
ought to have some means of de¬ 
fending themselves ag s ! encroach¬ 
ments of the Natl Gov! . . . And 
what better means can we provide 
than the giving them some share 
in, or rather to make them a con¬ 
stituent part of, the Nat! Estab¬ 
lishment. Madison, III, 120. 

1787. 

He urged that such a univer¬ 
sality of the power [to negative 
all laws judged improper] was in¬ 
dispensably necessary to render it 
effectual. Madison, III, 121. 

He had no objection to author¬ 
ize a negative to paper money and 
similar measures. Madison, III, 
128. 

New States too haviug separate 
views from the old States will 
never come into the Union. They 
may even be under some foreign 
influence. Madison, III, 123. 


In this case Delaware would 
have about V 90 for its share in the 
General Councils, whilst Pa & Va 
would possess % of the whole. Is 
there no difference of interests, no 
rivalship of commerce, of manufac- 



10 


If there be a negative in G. G. 
yet if a law can pass through all 
the forms of S — C it will require 
force to abrogate it. 


Butler. Will a man throw afloat 
his property & confide it to a gov¬ 
ernment a thousand miles distant ? 

June 16, 

M r Lansing. N[ew] S[ystem] 
proposes to draw representation 
from the whole body of people, 
without regard to S[tate] sover¬ 
eignties. 

Subs : proposes to preserve the 
State Sovereignties. 

Powers. Different Legislatures 
had a different object. 

Revise the confederation. 

Ind. States cannot be supposed 
to be willing to annihilate the 
States. 

State of New York would not 
have agreed to send members on 
this ground. 


In vain to devise systems how¬ 
ever good which will not be 
adopted. 

If convulsions happen nothing 
we can do will give them a direc¬ 
tion. 

Legislatures cannot be expected 
to make such a sacrafice. 

The wisest men in forming a 
system from theory apt to be mis¬ 
taken. 


tures ? Will not these large 
States crush the small ones when¬ 
ever they stand in the way of their 
ambitions or interested views. . . . 
If the State does not obey the law 
of the new System, must not force 
be resorted to as the only ultimate 
remedy. Madison, III, 125-6. 


1789. 


He was decidedly of opinion 
that the power of the Convention 
was restrained to amendments of a 
federal nature, and having for 
their basis the Confederacy in 
being. 

N. York would never have con¬ 
curred in sending deputies to the 
Convention, if she had supposed 
the deliberations were to turn on 
a consolidation of the States, and 
a National Government. 

It is in vain to propose what 
will not accord with these [senti¬ 
ments of people.] 


11 


The present national govern¬ 
ment has no precedent or experi¬ 
ence to support it. 

General opinion that certain ad¬ 
ditional powers ought to be given 
to Congress. 

M r . Patterson. 1. plan accords 
with powers. 

2 . plan accords with sentiments 
of the People. 

If Confederation radically defec¬ 
tive we ought to return to our 
states and tell them so. 

Comes not here to speak senti¬ 
ments of his own but to speak the 
sense of his Constituents. 

States treat[ed] as equal. 

Present Compact gives one vote 
to each state. 

Alterations are to be made by 
Congress and all the Legislatures. 

All parties to a Contract must 
assent to its dissolution. 

States collectively have advan¬ 
tages in which the smaller states 
do not participate — therefore in¬ 
dividual rules do not apply. 

Force of government will not 
depend on proportion of represen¬ 
tation — but on 

Quantity of power. 

Check not necessary in a ge[n- 
e]ral government of communities 
— but 

in an individual state spirit of 
faction is to be checked. 

How have Congress hitherto 
conducted themselves ? 

The People approve of Congress 
but think they have not powers 
enough. 


The Scheme is itself totally 
novel. There is no parallel to it 
to be found. 

An augmentation of the powers 
of Congress will be readily ap¬ 
proved by them. Madison, III, 
171, 2. 

He preferred it because it ac¬ 
corded 1. with the powers of the 
Convention, 2 with the sentiments 
of the people. 

If the confederacy was radically 
wrong, let us return to our States, 
and obtain larger powers, not as¬ 
sume them ourselves. 

I came here not to speak my 
own sentiments, but the sentiments 
of those who sent me. 

5th. art: of confederation giv¬ 
ing each State a vote. 

13th. declaring that no altera¬ 
tion shall be made with unanimous 
consent. 

What is unanimously done must 
be unanimously undone. 


Its efficacy will depend on the 
quantum of power collected, not 
on its being drawn from the States, 
or from the individuals. 

The reason of the precaution [a 
check] is not applicable to this 
case. Within a particular State, 
where party heats prevail, such a 
check may be necessary. 

Do the people at large complain 
of Cong s ? No, what they wish is 
that Cong s may have more power. 


12 


body constituted like Congress 
from the fewness of their numbers 
more wisdom and energy — 

than the complicated system of 
Virginia. 

Expence enormous. 

180 commons, 90 senators, 270. 


Wilson. Points of Disagreement. 



Va. 

N. J. 

1 . 

2 or three 
branches. 

One branch. 

2 . 

Derives author¬ 



ity from 
people. 

from States 

3. 

Proportion of 
suffrage. 

Equality. 

4. 

Single Executive. 

Plural. 

5. 

Majority to gov¬ 

Minority to 


ern. 

govern. 

6 . 

Legislate in all 

Partial ob¬ 


matters of gen¬ 
eral concern. 

jects. 

7. 

Negative. 

None. 

8 . 

Removeable by 

On applica¬ 


impeachment. 

tion of ma¬ 
jority of 
executives. 

9. 

Qualified negative 
by Executive. 

None. 

10. Infferior] tribunals. None. 

11 . 

, Original] Jurisdic- 


tion in all cases 
of Nat: Rev. 

None. 

12 . 

National Gov¬ 

To be rati¬ 


ernment to 

fied by Leg¬ 


be ratified by 
People. 

islatures. 


Empowered to propose every 
thing, to conclude nothing. 

Does not think State govern¬ 
ments the idols of the people. 


With proper powers Cong? will 
act with more energy & wisdom 
than the proposed Nat! Legislature; 
being fewer in number. 

You have 270 coming once at 
least a year from the most distant 
as well as the most central parts 
of the republic . . . can so expen¬ 
sive a system be seriously thought 
of? Madison, III, 172-175. 

See Madison III, 175, 176. 


p. 176 
p. 176 


13 




Thinks a competent national 
government will be a favorite of 
the people. 

Complaints from every part of 
United States that the purposes of 
government cannot be answered. 

In constituting a government 
not merely necessary to give 
proper powers, but to give them 
to proper hands. 

Two reasons against giving ad- p. 177 

ditional powers to Congress. 

First it does not stand on the 
authority of the people. 

Second, It is a single branch. 

Inequality, the poison of all 
governments. 

Lord Chesterfield speaks of a 
Commission to be obtained for a 
member of a small province. 

Pinkney 

/ 

Mr. Elsworth. 


M r . Randolph. Spirit of the 
People in favour of the Virginia 
V scheme. 

We have powers; but if we had M r . Randolph was not scrupu- 
not we ought not to scruple. lous on the point of power. 


June 19, 1787. 


Maddison. Breach of compact 
in one article releases the whole. 

Treaties may still be violated 
by the States under the Jersey 
plan. 

Appellate jurisdiction not suffi¬ 
cient because second trial cannot 
be had under it. 


A breach of the fundamental 
principles of the compact by a 
part of the Society would cer¬ 
tainly absolve the other part from 
their obligation to it. Madison 
III, 210. 

The proposed amendment to it 
[Confederation] does not supply 
the omission. Madison, III, 212. 

Of what avail c d an appellate 
tribunal be, after an acquittal? 
Madison, III, 213. 


14 


Attempts made by one of the 
greatest monarchs of Europe to 
equalize the local peculiarities of 
the separate provinces — in which 
the agent fell a victim. 


It had been found impossible 
for one of the most absolute 
princes in Europe (K. of France) 
directed by the wisdom of one of 
the most enlightened Ministers 
(M r . Neckar) Ac. Madison, III, 
219. 


June 20, 1787. 


M r Lansing. Resolved that the 
powers of legislation ought to be 
vested in the United States in 
Congress. 

If our plan be not adopted it 
will produce those mischiefs which 
we are sent to obviate. 

Principles of system. 

Equality of Representation. 

Dependence of members of Con¬ 
gress on States. 

So long as state distinctions 
exist, state prejudices will operate 
whether election be by states or 
people. 

If no interest to oppress no 
need of apportionment. 


Virginia 16. Delaware 1. 

Will General Government have 
leisure to examine state laws ? 

Will G. Government have the 
necessary information ? 

Will states agree to surrender? 

Let us meet public opinion & 
hope the progress of sentiment 
will make future arrangements. 


M r Lansing . . . moved . . 

“ that the powers of legislation be 
vested in the U. States in Con¬ 
gress.” Madison, III, 227. 


If it were true that such a 
uniformity of interests existed 
among the States, there was equal 
safety for all of them, whether the 
representation remained as here¬ 
tofore, or were proportioned as 
now proposed. Madison, III, 228. 

Is it conceivable that there will 
be leisure for such a task. Madi¬ 
son, III, 229. 

Will the members of the General 
Legislature be competent judges? 
Madison, III, 229. 


15 


Would like my [Hamilton’s] 
system if it could be established. 

System without example. 

M r Mason. Objection to grant¬ 
ing power to Congress arose from 
their constitution. 

Sword and purse in one body. 


Two principles in which America 
are unanimous. 

1 . Attachment to Republican 
government. 

2 . Attachment to two branches 
of legislature. 

Military force and liberty in¬ 
compatible. 


Will people maintain a stand¬ 
ing army ? 

Will endeavour to preserve 
State governments & draw lines 
— trusting to posterity to amend. 

Mf Martin. General Govern¬ 
ment originally formed for the 
preservation of state governments. 

Objection to giving power to 
Congress has originated with the 
legislatures. 

so of the states interested in an 
equal voice. 

Real motive was an opinion that 
there ought to be distinct govern¬ 
ments & not a general govern¬ 
ment. 


Is it to be thought that, the 
people of America . . . will sur¬ 
render both the sword and the 
purse to the same body? Madison, 
III, 231. 

In two points he was sure it 
was well settled. 1. in an attach¬ 
ment to Republican government. 

2 . in an attachment to more than 
one branch in the legislature, do. 

The most jarring elements of 
Nature . . . are not more in¬ 
compatible than such a mixture 
of civil liberty and military execu¬ 
tion. do. 232. 

See Madison, III, 232, 233. 


General Government was in¬ 
stituted for the purpose of that 
support [of State governments]. 

It was the Legislatures not the 
people who refused to enlarge their 
powers. 

Otherwise ten of the States 
must always have been ready 
to place further confidence in 
Congress. 

People of America preferred 
the establishment of themselves 
into 13 separate sovereignties in¬ 
stead of incorporating themselves 
into one. 



16 


If we should form a general 
government twould break to pieces. 

For common safety instituted a 
General government. 

Jealousy of power the motive. 

People have delegated all their 
authority to State government. 

Caution necessary to both 
systems. 

Requisitions necessary upon one 
system as upon another. 

In their system made requisi¬ 
tions necessary in the first in¬ 
stance but left Congress in the 
second instance to assess them¬ 
selves. 

Judicial tribunals in the differ¬ 
ent states would become odious. 

If we always to make a change 
we shall be always in a state of 
infancy. 

States will not be disposed 
hereafter to strengthen the general 
government. 

Mr Sherman. Confederacy car¬ 
ried us through the war. 

Non compliances of states owing 
to various embarrassments. 

Why should state legislatures be 
unfriendly ? 

State governments will always 
have the confidence & government 
of the people ; if they cannot be 
conciliated no efficacious govern¬ 
ment can be established. 

Sense of' all states that one 
branch is sufficient. 

If consolidated all treaties will 
be void. 


Madison, III, 233, 234. 

People of states having already 
tested their powers in their re¬ 
spective Legislatures &c. 


. . . would be viewed with 
a jealousy inconsistent with its 
usefulness. 


Congress carried us through 
the war. 

Much might be said in apology 
for the failure ... to comply 
with the confederation. 

Saw no reason why the State 
Legislatures should be unfriendly. 


In none of the ratifications is 
the want of two branches noticed 
or complained of. 

To consolidate the States . . . 
would dissolve our treaties. 


17 


State governments more fit for Each State like each individual 
local legislation, customs, habits has its peculiar habits usages and 
&c. manners. Madison, III, 235, 236. 


Date unidentified. 1 

Mf Pinckney, is of opinion that 
the first branch ought to be ap¬ 
pointed in such manner as the 
legislatures shall direct. 

Impracticable for general legis¬ 
lature to decide contested elections. 


1 On same sheet with the notes for June 19. 










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